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Negligent Parking of Automobiles
James G. Young*
L IABILITY FOR AN ACCIDENT involving both a moving vehicle
and a stationary one is most commonly imputed to the mov-
ing vehicle. However, numerous cases involving various fact sit-
uations have held otherwise. It is the object of this note to re-
view the reasoning of these decisions.
Under ordinary circumstances, allowing a car to stand in a
street or highway is not of itself negligence, if the stop is tem-
porary and for a legitimate or necessary purpose. But restric-
tions are often imposed by government regulations, and the right
to stop when the occasion requires it has been held to be inci-
dental to the right to travel the highway.
Motorists have the right to assume that the road ahead is
clear and safe for ordinary travel.1 Rulings have shown that
reasonable stops on the traveled portion of the highway do not
include stopping to remove frost,2 snow,3 or to clear vision ob-
scured by low lying smoke.4 Nor is it justified by loss of a head-
light,5 stalling,6 or running out of gas.7 In any of these situations,
the driver could have pulled onto the shoulder of the road.
Temporary and reasonable stops that have been held accept-
able include that of a rural delivery postman in front of a mail-
box,8 a driver checking a shifting load,9 and loading or discharg-
ing passengers and/or merchandise. 10
* B.S. in Bus. Admin., Ohio State Univ.; Mortgage Loan Representative,
Northwestern Mutual Life Insur. Co.; Third-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
I New Cigar Co. v. Broken Spur, Inc., 103 Ga. App. 395, 119 S. E. 2d 133
(1961).
2 O'Brien v. Dunigan, 187 Or. 227, 210 P. 2d 567 (1949).
3 Henry v. Hallquest, 226 Minn. 39, 31 N. W. 2d 641 (1948); Peck v. Hick-
man, 321 S. W. 2d 395 (Ky. App. 1959). Ice and snow do not excuse park-
ing in manner that ordinarily would be negligent per se.
4 Fequer v. Brown, 130 F. Supp. 637 (N. D. Ind. 1955).
5 Weir v. Caffery, 247 Wis. 70, 18 N. W. 2d 327 (1945).
6 Axelrod v. Krupinski, 302 N. Y. 367, 98 N. E. 2d 561 (1951).
7 Opple v. Ray, 208 Ind. 450, 195 N. E. 81 (1935); Glenn v. Orfutt, 309 S. W.
2d 366 (Mo. 1958).
8 Borden v. Daniel, 48 Tenn. App. 314, 346 S. W. 2d 283 (1961).
9 Ceccacci v. Garre, 158 Or. 466, 76 P. 2d 283 (1938).
10 Evansville & 0. V. Ry. Co. v. Wollsey, 120 Ind. 570, 93 N. E. 2d 355 (1950).
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Violation of Ordinance or Statute
Newman v. Owl Transfer and Storage Co." defines parking
as: "Something more than a mere temporary and reasonable
stop for a necessary purpose." 12 This definition was applied in
Naylor v. Dragoon."1 Plaintiff parked on the side of a road while
her husband went across the road to register their dog in a ken-
nel. While she was waiting for him, her car was hit in the rear
by another auto. The court held that the stop was more than
temporary, and that the plaintiff was in violation of a statute. 4
Violation of Statute or Ordinance
Although parking a car or truck in violation of a safety
statute is generally negligence per se, plaintiff must still prove
that the illegal parking was the proximate cause of the accident.
The violation of a statute does not automatically mean that there
will be recovery against the violator.
In Medlin v. Bickford 5 defendant had parked illegally.
Auto A, approaching from the rear, attempted to pass defend-
ant's auto and sideswiped car B, approaching from the opposite
direction. Auto A then jumped the curb, hitting the plaintiff,
a pedestrian walking on the sidewalk. Defendant's parking was
found to be negligence per se. In discussing the question of an
intervening cause, the court held that if the accident was reason-
ably foreseeable and the probable consequence of illegal parking
this causal connection was not broken. Certainly the pedestrian
fell into the class which the safety rule seeks to protect.
(Continued from preceding page)
See also Northern Indiana Transit Co. v. Burk, 228 Ind. 162, 89 N. E. 2d 905
(1950). Busses loading and unloading passengers must still park or stop in
accordance with the governing statute. The fact that they are common car-
riers does not excuse them. In DeLuca v. Manchester Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Co., 380 Pa. 484, 112 A. 2d 372 (1955), a stop to load was found to
be temporary.
11 51 Wash. 2d 67, 316 P. 2d 120 (1957).
12 Ibid., 316 P. 2d at 124.
1" 116 Vt. 552, 80 A. 2d 600 (1951).
14 V. S. A. 47, 10-219, Par. XHI.
15 106 Ga. App. 859, 128 S. E. 2d 531 (1962). In Marchl v. Dowling & Co.,
157 Pa. Super. 91, 41 A. 2d 427 (1945) negligent double parking brought re-
sults similar to Medlin. In Backers v. Cedartown Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
106 Ga. App. 764, 128 S. E. 2d 355 (1962) a pedestrian, hit while walking
around an illegally parked truck could not recover against owners of the
truck when it was found that city ordinance was not designed to protect
class into which plaintiff fell.
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Blocking the view of other cars, by parking at an intersec-
tion in violation of a city ordinance, has also been held to be the
proximate cause of an accident.' 6 So is parking at a railroad
crossing in violation of a statute,17 completely blocking the view
of a passing motorist.' 8
The negligence of a motorist who ran a stop sign was super-
seded by that of the defendant whose bus completely obscured
the sign in violation of an ordinance. The court found that the
resulting collision probably would not have happened had the
sign been visible. 19
After plaintiff hit defendant's illegally parked car, the de-
fendant claimed that plaintiff's driving had caused the accident.
Answering this claim, in Steagull v. Houston Fire & Casualty
Insurance Co.,20 the court said:
The intervening cause will not relieve defendant of liability
if it was reasonably foreseeable and a normal incident of the
risk created by defendant's negligence. 21
Two tests help to determine whether or not a negligently
parked auto is the legal cause of an accident, according to Ber-
trand v. Trunkline Gas Co.: 
22
1. Was the negligence of the obstructing driver's auto a
cause in fact of the collision?, and
2. Was the plaintiff a member of the class of persons sought
to be protected by the statute or safety rule which was
violated? 23
16 Domitz v. Springfield Bottlers, 359 Mo. 412, 221 S. W. 2d 831 (1949).
17 L. S. A. R. S. 14: 97. Simple Obstruction of Highway Commerce. Per-
tains to acts of obstruction that make movement more difficult.
18 Bergeron v. Greyhound Corp., 100 So. 2d 923 (La. 1958). Also, Thiessen
v. Wabash Railroad Co., 41 Ill. App. 2d 238, 190 N. E. 2d 498 (1963).
19 Meridian Hatcheries, Inc. v. Troutman, 230 Miss. 493, 93 So. 2d 472
(1957).
20 138 So. 2d 433 (La. 1962); see also Hall v. Cable Dairies, 234 N. C. 206,
67 S. E. 2d 63 (1951). It was held that defendant would not have to foresee
the particular injury as long as an accident resulted from defendant's negli-
gence: Eberhart v. Abshire, 158 F. 2d 24 (7th Cir. 1946).
21 Id at 138 So. 2d 437.
22 149 So. 2d 152 (La. 1963); also Lanzer v. Wentworth, 315 S. W. 2d 622
(Ky. App. 1958). Recovery disallowed when it was found that deceased did
not fall into the class the safety statute sought to protect.
23 Id. at 154, 155. Dixie-Drive-It-Yourself-System New Orleans Co. v.
American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 128 So. 2d 841 (1961) contains the de-
cision from which these tests evolved.
May, 1965
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
NEGLIGENT PARKING
For instance, in Weubbles v. Shea,24 Lamar parked his car
at the northwest corner of Franklin and 12th Street within ten
feet of an intersection, in violation of a statute.2 5 Shea turned
left onto Franklin as he entered the intersection from the south.
Weubbles, heading east on the same street, swerved to avoid col-
liding with Shea. He lost control of his auto and hit Lamar's
parked car. Recovery was sought against Lamar on the basis
that his parking violation constituted negligence and interfered
with clear passage of the street. The court, however, found that
the accident was caused by two independent factors which were
the proximate cause, and with which Lamar was unconnected.
A double-parked panel truck was found to be a condition
rather than the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries in Jarosh
v. Van Meter.26 While Van Meter was passing the parked panel
truck he hit Jarosh, a pedestrian, who was jaywalking imme-
diately in front of the truck. Plaintiff Jarosh claimed that the
parked truck blocked his view and that the truck was at least
a concurrent, if not a proximate cause of the injury. The court
disagreed. Jarosh did see the truck before starting across the
street. So did Van Meter. Under these circumstances (and with
no other traffic to distract their attention) the double-parked
truck merely created a condition which both Jarosh and Van
Meter knew-and which, under the circumstances, could not be
the proximate cause.
In a recent Ohio decision,2 7 plaintiff was standing in the
back of a parked truck in violation of a city ordinance .2  This
truck was struck from the rear by defendant's truck. The de-
fendant admitted negligence, but said that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence, his violation of an ordinance being neg-
ligence per se. The jury found that defendant's negligence was
24 294 Ill. App. 157, 13 N. E. 2d 646 (1948); see also Clark v. Morrison, 406
Pa. 130, 177 A. 2d 96 (1962): accident resulted from stop light violation
rather than defendant's car parked too near intersection. Collar v. Meyer,
251 Wis. 292, 29 N. W. 2d 31 (1947): violation did not constitute Proximate
cause. Evans v. General Steamship Corp., 220 Or. 476, 349 P. 2d 269 (1960):
taxi illegally parked was not proximate cause of accident when fare opened
door on traffic side. Also, Young v. Lamson, 121 Vt. 474, 160 A. 2d 873(1960); and Howell v. Kansas City Southern Transport Co., 66 So. 2d 646
(La. 1953).
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937 c. 95 187.
26 171 Neb. 61, 105 N. W. 2d 531 (1960).
27 White v. Ohio Power Co., 171 Ohio St. 148, 168 N. E. 2d 314 (1960).
28 Code of City of Ironton, Ohio, Art. 5, Sec. 19.
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss2/12
14 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
the proximate cause of the accident. The verdict was upheld by
the court, which said:
This is in accordance with the rule summarized in 6 Ohio
Jurisprudence (2d), 532, Section 284: 'Manifestly the con-
tributory negligence of a plaintiff, to bar recovery, must con-
tribute as a proximate cause of his own injury. The negli-
gence of the plaintiff may be concurrent with the negligence
of the defendant and not be, strictly speaking, a proximate
cause of the injury.' 29
Double parking must be the proximate cause of the accident,
even if a safety statute is violated.30
Failure to Use Warning Signals
Failure to display proper warning lights, flares, or reflectors,
when stopped or parked along the highway, is often a ground for
liability, particularly where display is required by statute.
In Gutierrez v. Koury3' a truck was left on the pavement
without displaying warning signals as prescribed by statute. 2
Plaintiff hit the truck, was injured, and charged defendant with
negligence per se. The court held that it was reasonable for the
plaintiff to assume that the road was clear, and that defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Similarly, a defendant who allowed his unlighted trailer to
extend onto the traveled portion of a highway was held to have
created a safety hazard.-3
Flares and other warning devices must be displayed proper-
ly. Thus, when a statute34 specified that flares be placed on the
road, defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law when
he attached a flare to a corner of his trailer. 35
Failure to carry proper warning devices resulted in a finding
of negligence in Jess v. McNamer.3 6 Defendant's truck bogged
29 White v. Ohio Power Co., supra, n. 39, at 315, 316.
30 Maloney v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 174 N. Y. S. 2d 257, 5 A. D. 2d 1015
(1958).
31 57 N. M. 741, 263 P. 2d 557 (1953). See also Car & General Insurance
Corp. v. Cheshire, 159 F. 2d 985 (5th Cir., 1947); LeClair v. Bruley, 119 Vt.
164, 122 A. 2d 742 (1956); Leek v. Dillard, 304 S. W. 2d 60 (Mo. 1957).
32 Sec. 68-523 (c.) of 1941 compilation.
33 Sandifier Oil Co. v. The Home Indemnity Co., 150 F. Supp. 265 (W. D.
La. 1957).
34 Iowa Code of 1946, Sec. 321.448. Regulates display of flares.
35 Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 27 N. W. 2d 15 (1947).
36 42 Wash. 2d 466, 255 P. 2d 902 (1953).
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down in snow, at night. He had no flares to display as required
by statute. 37 Instead he tried to warn oncoming traffic with hand
signals. Bad weather and darkness limited visibility, and plain-
tiff collided with the parked truck. In spite of defendant's at-
tempt to prevent the accident, it was held that his failure to com-
ply with the statute was nevertheless the proximate cause of the
accident.
Failure to display flares as required by statute38 was a bar
to recovery in a suit for wrongful death by the estate of a truck
driver who had remained in the cab of his parked truck and was
struck from behind. His failure to set out flares was held to be
contributory negligence.
39
Removing Disabled Vehicles
Every effort must be made to remove a disabled vehicle from
the road as quickly as possible. In Capitol Transport v. A. R.
Blossman, Inc., 40 the plaintiff's truck which carried inflammable
materials had a blowout. The driver pulled onto the shoulder of
the road so that one set of wheels remained on the road. The
driver set out reflectors and called his office for help. A passing
state policeman observed that the truck was parked in accord-
ance with the safety rules. Twelve hours later the truck was still
there when defendant's truck hit it from behind. Plaintiff was
denied damages, the court holding that plaintiff had allowed his
truck to remain in a danger-creating position longer than reason-
ably necessary for the particular type of breakdown.
Movement of Unoccupied Vehicles
Motor vehicles sometimes move without the benefit of a
driver. In Kolbe v. Public Market Delivery and Transfer,41 the
defendant's truck was parked on a slight incline while the driver
ran an errand. During his absence the truck rolled down the
street, hitting the Kolbes' car, injuring Mrs. Kolbe. It was
shown that the brakes were defective. The court found that the
accident was caused by lack of care by the defendant's employee,
and defendant was liable.
37 R. C. W. 46.40.210.
38 R. C. M. 1947, 31-108.
39 Burns v. Fisher, 132 Mont. 26, 313 P. 2d 1044 (1957).
40 218 La. 1086, 51 So. 2d 795 (1951).
41 130 Wash. 302, 226 P. 1021 (1924), also Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594,
85 N. W. 2d 345 (1957).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss2/12
14 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
When an owner leaves his car at a service station-in gear
and with the motor running-the owner and not the service sta-
tion attendant is liable for injuries caused when his runaway car
hits a passerby. 42 In this case the car began to roll right after
the owner left the car and before the service station attendant
took over control.
A recent New York case 43 found that the defendant had hur-
riedly parked his car in a driveway with a slight incline. He did
not turn his wheels to the side of the drive as required by stat-
ute.44 The car rolled into plaintiff's house. Defendant disclaimed
all negligence on the ground that there was no evidence as to
whether anyone had caused it to roll. Plaintiff alleged that the
facts constituted a prima facie case of negligence in that the
wheels were not turned as required by statute. Had the wheels
been turned properly the accident would not have happened
even if the brakes were not set.
Leaving Key in Car
Liability for the subsequent negligent act of a thief may or
may not (depending on the state) be imputed to the owner of
a stolen vehicle who has left his car unattended with the key in
the ignition.
A leading case is Ross v. Hartman.45 The defendant parked
his truck in an alley and left the key in the ignition. The attend-
ant, who was then supposed to park the car in a garage, claimed
that he was not notified to do so. A short time later an unknown
person took the truck and drove it negligently, striking the plain-
tiff. The defendant had left the truck parked in violation of a
city ordinance 46 which forbids leaving the key in the ignition of
an unlocked vehicle. The court held that defendant's negligent
conduct was the proximate cause of the accident. The court rea-
soned that the parking ordinance is designed to protect the pub-
lic, and that its violation is an invitation to thieves to steal the
car and constitutes negligence. The court held that the fact that
42 Storey v. Parker, 12 So. 2d 88 (La. 1943).
43 Davidson v. Hicks, 34 Misc. (N. Y.) 451, 228 N. Y. S. 2d 439 (1963); Ar-
nett v. Yeago, 247 N. C. 356, 100 S. E. 2d 855 (1957).
44 Vehicle and Traffic Law, Sec. 1210, subd. (a).
45 78 U. S. App. D. C., 139 F. 2d 14, 158 A. L. R. 1370 (1943), cert. den. 64 S.
Ct. 790, 321 U. S. 790, 88 L. Ed. 1080.
46 Traffic and Motor Regulations for the Dist. of Col., Sec. 58.
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a thief actually caused the accident was immaterial because the
defendant's action was the proximate cause.
Under similar facts, Ostergard v. Frisch47 followed the rea-
soning set down in the Ross case, 48 which is now considered to be
the minority view. A thief took the vehicle 6% blocks, and neg-
ligently struck the plaintiff. Defendant's negligence created a
hazard to the general public and the court refused to accept the
argument that the results of this act-a thief's negligent driving
-could not be reasonably foreseen.
A Minnesota case, Wannebo v. Gates,49 started a reversal of
this trend. The facts were similar to those in the preceding cases,
and the plaintiff used the same reasoning. The court did not
agree. It was inferred that in these two cases the accidents oc-
curred while the thief was still in flight, the flight coming as a
result of defendant's negligence. In the present case, the acci-
dent occurred many miles and some hours after the theft, when
the thief was no longer in flight. Making this distinction, the
court felt that it would be unreasonable to hold defendant liable
for something that in fact might have occurred weeks or months
later. The effect of any safety statute would have ceased. The
defendant was found not liable.
The rule of Ostergard° was reversed in Illinois by Cockerell
v. Sullivan.51 The court reasoned that the accident resulting
from the theft was too remote for defendant's action to be the
proximate cause and that defendant could not reasonably foresee
it. The court then stated that a locked car, or one without a key,
would certainly not stop a thief determined to steal it. And the
safety precaution of these statutes has little practical effect in
stopping auto thefts.52
47 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N. E. 2d 537 (1948). Mellish v. Cooney, 23 Conn.
Sup. 350, 183 A. 2d 753 (1962) is one of the few recent cases adopting this
view, although this was the first case of this type to be decided in Connec-
ticut.
48 Ross v. Hartman, supra n. 47.
49 227 Minn. 194, 34 N. W. 2d 695 (1948).
50 Ostergard v. Frisch, supra n. 49.
51 344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N. E. 878 (1951).
52 There have been numerous law review articles written on the key cases
in recent years. A discussion of the need to correct the apparent loophole
in the safety statutes is found in Fernandes, Leaving Keys In A Vehicle:
Should There Be A Statute, 14 Hastings L. R. 444 (1963).
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The Ohio case of Garbo v. Walker53 also adopts the theory
that it is questionable whether a car owner can reasonably fore-
see that the theft of a car and its negligent operation can cause
an accident, even if the key is left in the car. The jury decided
that the ordinance 54 violation was not negligence per se.
Many states 5 now follow the majority view, holding that the
intervening negligence of the thief, rather than the negligence of
the owner or the violation of the statute, is the proximate cause
of the injury.
Conclusion
Improper parking, failure to use warning signals, failure to
remove disabled vehicles, movement of unoccupied vehicles, or
leaving the key in an unattended vehicle, each may result in
liability of the owner or driver, particularly if the negligent act
is in violation of an ordinance or statute. Violation of a safety
statute, however, is a basis for recovery only if the violation is
the proximate cause of the accident. The foremost purpose of
such statutes is to bring safety to the roads. Recovery against
those who violate these laws is a secondary consideration.
53 71 Ohio L. Abs. 368, 129 N. E. 2d 537 (1955).
54 Ordinance No. 1203-A-46 a.n.a. 9.0936, Certified Ordinances of the City
of Cleveland.
55 Ariz.-Shafer v. Monte Mansfield Motors, 91 Ariz. 331, 372 P. 2d 333
(1962).
Cal.-Hergenrether v. Collier, 36 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1963).
Col.-Lambotte v. Payton, 167 P. 2d 167 (Col. 1961).
Fla.-Lingefelt v. Hanner, 125 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1960).
Ind.-Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N. E. 2d 395 (1952).
Ky.-Frank v. Ralston, 145 F. Supp. 294 (W. D. Ky., 1956).
La.-Town of Jackson v. Mounger Motors, Inc., 98 So. 2d 697 (La. 1957).
Mass.-Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 225, 91 N. E. 2d 560 (1948).
Md.-Liberto v. Holfeldt, 155 A. 2d 698 (Md. 1959).
Mich.-Corinitti v. Wittkopp, 355 Mich. 170, 93 N. W. 2d 906 (1959).
Minn.-Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N. W. 2d 272 (1950).
Miss.-Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 229 Miss. 385, 91 So. 2d 243
(1956).
Mo.-Gower v. Lamb, 282 S. W. 2d 867 (Mo. 1955).
Neb.-Hersh v. Miller, 169 Neb. 517, 99 N. W. 2d 878 (1959).
N. C.-Williams v. Mickens, 247 N. C. 262, 100 S. E. 2d 511 (1957).
N. Y.-Wilson v. Harrington, 269 App. Div. 891, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 157 (1945);
affd. 295 N. Y. 667, 65 N. E. 2d 101.
Ohio-Ross v. Nutt, 177 Ohio St. 113, 203 N. E. 2d 118 (1964).
R. I.-Clements v. Tashjoin, 91 R. I. 308, 168 A. 2d 472 (1961).
Tenn.-Teague v. Pritchard, 38 Tenn. App. 686, 279 S. W. 2d 706 (1954).
Tex.-Parker & Parker Construction Co. v. Morris, 346 S. W. 2d 922
(Tex. 1961).
D. C.-Casey v. Carson & Gruman Co., 221 F. 2d 51 (D. C. Cir. 1955).
Here negligence of driver was too remote, as accident happened many
hours afterward. Ross v. Hartman (supra n. 47) does not govern.
May, 1965
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
